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INDIANA CRIMINAL AND PENAL LEGISLATION
RESPECTING WOMEN
BY DANIEL JAMES*
I
PREFATORY
The American cradle of the women's rights movement, so
called, was New Harmony, Indiana. The man who furnished
the impetus for that movement in its inception can be definitely
named. He was Robert Dale Owen. Because of his belief in
equality between the sexes he gave to women a voice equal with
men in conducting the affairs of his colony. One of the first
women attracted to New Harmony was Fanny Wright, the
famous pioneer feminist and ward of Jeremy Bentham. She
founded the first recorded women's club, the Female Social So-
ciety, in New Harmony in 1825, and was associated editorially
with Owen in several publications which were extremely radical,
for their time, on the question of women's emancipation.'
The first blow in an attempt to mold women's rights into the
form of law was also struck by Owen. As a representative in
the convention that drafted the Indiana Constitution of 1852,
he began, early in the proceedings, a contest which lasted almost
until the convention dissolved. He advocated only one simple
provision for the constitution: that married women should be
allowed to acquire and possess separate property and have it
recorded.2 There was some tendency to try to laugh him down
with the good humored toleration we accord those whom we
believe to be a bit unbalanced on a particular subject; but when
the success of his proposition assumed serious proportions, the
debates became stormy and voluminous, with much quoting of
poetry and scripture back and forth.3 His proposition failed
to become a part of the fundamental law of the state, but his
brilliant advocacy of it served to bring the evils of the old law
* Of the New York Bar.
SBoston Transcript, Jan. 24, 1931, Magazine Section, p. 3.
2 Debates and Proo. Ind. Conat. Conv., 1850, Vol. 1, 114-115.
3 Ibid., Vol i, 114-115, 462-486, 497-535, 797-799; Vol. ii, 1153-1196, 1875,
1896-1900, 2012-2013.
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to light, and gave the question of women's rights a vitality it
had never before had.4
The fight was then carried to the legislature, and within the
next three decades there were passed no less than twenty-three
statutes gradually chiseling out legal capacities for women with
respect to property.5 The contest was for a long time confined
to property rights alone; it is not until 1881 that we find any
legislative reference to women's political rights.6 It is not nec-
essary here to trace the separate steps of women's struggle for
freedom. It was slow and arduous, suffering many setbacks,7
and leading sometimes almost to violence.8
A restricted kind of educational advantages for women ap-
pears in the statutes earlier than women's rights. The first
legislative pronouncement appears as early as 1806, in the sec-
ond session of the First General Assembly of Indiana Territory.
In an act establishing Vincennes University (the money for
which was to be raised through lotteries) it was provided:
"That the said Trustees as soon as in their opinion the funds of the
said institution will admit are hereby required to establish an institution
for the education of females."9
The first women's independent educational institution to be
established, however, was the Monroe County Female Seminary,
4 A group of Indiana women in 1851 presented Owen with a silver
pitcher for his "true and noble advocacy" of their rights. Boston Tran-
script, ubi supra, note 1.
5 Rev. Stat. 1852, Vol. i, pp. 236, 250-251, 254, 505; Vol ii, pp. 28-29;
Acts 1853, Ch. 35; Acts '1857, Ch. 45, Ch. 46, Ch. 47; Acts 1859, Ch. 4,
Ch. 141; Acts 1861, Ch. 102; Acts 1866, Ch. 65, Ch. 85; Acts 1867, Ch.
122; Acts 1869, Ch. 30; Acts 1873, Ch. 43; Acts 1875, Ch. 7, Ch. 73; Acts
1877, Ch. 54; Acts 1879 (Spec. Ses.), Ch. 44, Ch. 160; Acts 1881, Ch. 38,
§§ 11, 38, Ch. 45, §§ 45, 122, 193-196, Ch. 60.
6 In 1881 a constitutional amendment was proposed to give women the
vote. Acts 1881 (Spec. Ses.), Joint Res. No. 8. It does not appear again
in the books.
7 The courts themselves, because of the dominance of the historical
school's idea of the futility of legislation, retarded the movement very
appreciably through rigid construction of emancipatory legislation. Pound,
Interpretations of Legal History, (1923) 65.
8 For example, when Eugene V. Debs brought Susan B. Anthony to
Terre Haute to talk on women's rights, her address had to be called off
after her arrival, because of violent feelings and the danger of riotous out-
break. Coleman, Eugene V. Debs, (1930) 47.
9 Acts Ind. Ter., 1806, Ch. 5, § 13; Ind. Ter. R. L., 1807, Ch. 67.
10 Acts 1833, Ch. 32.
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in 1833, where females were to be taught "any of the languages,
sciences, fine arts, ornamental branches, general literature, and
such other branches or departments of education, as the trustees
may authorize."' 1° Thereafter there followed a number of simi-
lar incorporations, all of them private and most of them denomi-
national institutions." The first one providing for coeducation
was the Lawrenceburg Male and Female Institute, in 1849.12 In
1852 the legislature petitioned Congress for two townships of
land for the support of an "Indiana Normal University for the
education of females," in order "to fit our daughters, not merely
for a business by which they may gain for themselves an honor-
able livelihood, but render most important services in the gen-
eral education of the State."'13 In 1866 a state normal school was
established to which women were admitted at the age of sixteen
and men at eighteen.' 4 The following year the first coed was
allowed to enter Indiana University-the first state university
in the United States to become coeducational. 15 Women became
"eligible to any office under the general or special school laws of
this State" in 1881.16
In view of this background of feministic leadership on the part
of Indiana, the criminal and penal law of the states should show
some repercussions in alteration of the common law treatment
of female offenders. The woman in the common law has never
been in the position of the woman under the early Roman law,
who was answerable for her misdeeds only to him in whose
manus or potestas she was.17 To be sure, there is Blackstone's
often quoted statement:
"The very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during
the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the
11 The following twenty local laws each incorporates a female college
or seminary: 1837, Ch. 55; 1840, Ch. 31; 1843, Ch. 35; 1846, Ch. 2; 1847,
Ch. 22; 1848, Ch. 62, Ch. 54 and Ch. 319; 1849, Ch. 18, Ch. 188 and Ch. 265;
1850, Ch. 18, Ch. 37, Ch. 140, Ch. 234, Ch. 283, Ch. 303 and Ch. 341; 1851,
Ch. 87 and Ch. 208.
12 Local Laws, 1849, Oh. 265. Two others followed within two years:
the Lagrange Male and Female Seminary, Local Laws, 1850. Ch. 234; and
the Laporte Male and Female Seminary, Local Laws, 1851, Ch. 87.
Is Local Laws, 1852, Ch. 22 (Joint Res.). Apparently nothing came of
the petition.
14 Acts 1866, Ch. 36.
15 Indiana University: 1820-1904, edited by S. B. Harding, (1904) 35.
16 Acts 1881 (Spec. Ses.), Ch. 118.
17 Couch, Woman in Early Roman Law, (1894) 8 Harv. L. Rev. 39, 42.
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husband: under whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs every-
hing."'s
The common law, however, has never carried this doctrine
very far into its disposition of criminal causes.' 9
Criminal women have usually acquired a great notoriety,20
but except for prostitutes, which have seldom been effectively
controlled, 21 female criminals have never presented as serious
a problem as their erring brothers, for they have not been as
numerous. 22 With women's emergence from the family group,
however, they presented problems of social control which began
to engage attention. Most of the instances, at least in modern
18 Commentaries, (1765) Bk. I, 442. This attitude was based upon a
premise which went without argument: that women are of an intrinsic
inferiority to men. See, e. g, Lecky, History of European Morals, (1869)
Vol. ii, 379, 381-382, 387-388.
19 A seventeenth century writer, unknown, having established the iden-
tity of husband and wife, adds: "But let her bee of good cheare, though
for the neere conjunction which is betweene man and wife, and to tye them
to a perfect love, agreement and adherence, they bee by intent and wise
fiction of the Law, one person, yet in nature & in some other cases by the
Law of God and man, they romaine divers, for as Adams punishment was
severall from Eves, so in criminall and other speciall causes our Law
argues them severall persons . . ." The only doubt the author had of
this position is that the word "person" applies to "any thing which hath
reason," and women were not clearly within that definition. The Womans
Lawier, (1632) 4.
20 E. g., some of the most vicious members of the early New York gangs
were women. Asbury, The Gangs of Newo York, (1927) 29, 51-52, 64-65.
2lMcCurdy, The Use of the Injunction to Destroy Commercialized Pros-
titution, (1929) 19 J. of Crim. L. and Criminol. 513; Lecky, op. cit., supra,
note 18, at 299-301; May, Social Control of Sex Expression, (1931) 126,
132-133, 205-206.
22 The respective numbers of men and women felons who were inmates
of penal institutions in Indiana during the first twenty-eight years of the
present century are given below at five year intervals. The figures are
taken from the Indiana Bu~letin of Charities and Correction, May, 1929,
p. 230.
Year Men Women Per Cent of Women
1901 1759 46 2.54
1906 2043 52 2.48
1911 2170 61 2.73
1916 2621 53 1.97
1921 2143 46 2.10
1926 3473 73 2.05
1928 3992 80 1.96
Perhaps if total convictions instead of mere total inmates could be given,
and if misdemeanants as well as felons could be included, the percentage
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times, in which women have received separate treatment in the
hands of the criminal law have been sexual crimes.23
II
DISCRIMINATIONS IN CRIMES AND PENALTIES
In certain instances the common law doctrine of identity of a
married couple has saved the wife from criminal punishment
for capital offenses.
"If a woman commit theft, burglary, or other civil offenses against the
laws of society by the coercion of her husband; or even in his company,
which the law construes a coercion; she is not guilty of any crime; being
considered as acting by compulsion and not of her own will."24
of women would be larger. In New York in 1913, it was stated that the
annual proportion of women among all persons who entered jails, work-
h&uses, reformatories and prisons was twenty-three per cent. Davis, A
Plan of Rational Treatment for Women Offenders, (1913) 4 J. of Crim.
L. and Criminol. 402. Lecky (op. cit., supra, note 18, at 380), on the au-
thority of a counsellor of the Imperial Court at Paris, says that male
criminals are five times as numerous as females. According to figures in
Prisoners in State and Federal Prisons and Reformatories (1931) issued by
U. S. Dept. of Com., Table 1, p. 3, women constituted 3.78 per cent of all
inmates in ninety-eight institutions on January 1, 1927, and 3.93 per cent
on January 1, 1928. As to accepting statistics of total inmates as indicat-
ing any more than a very rough estimate of a general trend, see the caveat,
ibid., p. 2.
23 There is indication also that the proportion of women among sex
offenders is greater than among any other class of criminals. 43.66 per
cent of all sex offenders, not including rape, who were received by state
prisons and reformatories in 1927, were women. Prisoners in State and
Federal Prisons and Reformatories, (1931) issued by U. S. Dept. of Com.,
Table 8, p. 15.
24 Blackstone's Commentaries, (1765) Bk. IV, 28; see also, Erwin, Hus-
band and Wife in the Criminal Law, (1895) 17 Crim. L. Mag. 269, 273-277.
Compare: "It is not a defense, to a married woman charged with a crime,
that the alleged criminal act was committed by her in the presence of her
husband." Cons. L. N. Y. (Penal), § 1092. Also, "A married woman who
commits an offense by the command or persuasion of her husband shall in
no case be punished with death, but may be imprisoned for life or for a
term of years, according to the nature of the crime; and in cases not
capital she shall receive only one-half the punishment to which she would
otherwise be liable." The husband shall, "at the discretion of the jury, in
capital cases be punished by death, and in other cases the punishment shall
be doubled." Com. Tex. Stat., P. C., 1928, Art. 32, 33. And if an accom-
plice in a crime stands in the relation of husband to the principal, he may
be punished by as much as double the highest penalty for the offense.
Ibid., Art. 75.
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But the wife's responsibility for murder or treason was her
own, even though she acted under coercion of her husband, for
such acts, being against nature, were not to be committed by
her even at his behest.25
At common law, because of the marital relation, a woman
could not be convicted of being an accessory after the fact for
harboring her husband after he had committed a felony. A
husband, however, would be guilty if he harbored a felon wife.26
When the benefit of clergy came into such abuse that compara-
tively few men who were guilty of capital crimes actually suf-
fered the penalty, it became necessary to extend the benefit of
clergy to women, whether they could write or not, in order to
equalize penalties. This concession to women was made during
the seventeenth century,27 and thereafter, instead of being
hanged for certain offenses, they were "burned in the hand and
whipped, stocked, or imprisoned for any time not exceeding
a year. '28
For the crime of treason men suffered an exceedingly cruel
death, but women, as Blackstone explains with eighteenth cen-
tury delicacy, could hardly be treated in the same way:
"For, as the decency due to the sex forbids the exposing and publicly
mangling their bodies, their sentence (which is to the full as terrible to
sensation as the other,), is, to be drawn to the gallows, and there to be
burned alive."2 9
There is a certain amount of miscellaneous sex discrimination
apparent in the Indiana statutes in the definition of crimes and
the fixing of penalties. Some of this can be explained on the
basis of common law ideas. Thus, in 1816 it was provided that
a man, married or unmarried, who cohabited with a married
woman, or a married man who cohabited with an unmarried
woman, was guilty of adultery, whereas a woman could be guilty
only if she were married.30 This was simply a small extension
25 Blackstone, op. cit., supra, note 18, at 444; op. cit., supra, note 19,
at 206.
26 "A woman cannot be accessory to her husband, insomuch as she is
forbidden by the Law of God to betray him." Op. cit., supra, note 19, at
206; see also, Lush, Husband and Wife, (2 ed. 1896) 14.
2721 Jac. I, Ch. 6 (1623); 3 & 4 W. & M. Ch. 9 (1691); 4 & 5 W. & M.
Ch. 24 (1692).
28 See Blackstone, op. cit., supra, note 23, at 369.
29 Commentaries, Bk. IV, 93.
30 Acts 1816, Ch. 33. in Connecticut such an offense is adultery only if
the woman is married. Gen. Stat., 1930, Rev. § 6223. In some states if either
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of the common law definition,&' which was framed to protect
the husband from being defrauded into bringing up the illegiti-
mate offspring of another, and to protect such property rights
as he had in his wife.32 He could even kill another man caught
in the act of adultery with his wife and yet be guilty only of
manslaughter.3 8
Many of the discriminations are hard to explain on any basis
other than the probable feelings of the legislators. Thus, in
1818 when it was made an offense for a white person to have
sexual intercourse with a negro, a penalty of a fine up to one
hundred dollars was provided for a man found guilty; a guilty
woman to be imprisoned for not more than ten days.3 4 A simi-
lar discrimination in penalties appears in 1821, when the penalty
for adultery or fornication for men was set at a fine in any
sum up to three hundred dollars; the penalty for women was
imprisonment up to three months.3 5 This was equalized twenty
years later.3 6 Again, for petit larceny the penalty provided in
1829 was: for men, fine and imprisonment in the state prison
for so much and so long as the jury should determine; for
women, a county jail sentence up to sixty days was imposed for
party is married both are guilty of adultery. Fla. Rev. Gen. Stat., 1920,
§ 5406; 39 Cons. L. N. Y. (Penal), § 100.
31 At common law, "adultery is sexual connection between a married
woman and an unmarried man, or a married man other than her own
husband." Hood v. State, 56 Ind. 263, 271 (1887).
32 May, op cit., supra, note 21, at 211; Lecky, op. cit., supra, note 18,
at 299, 365. As to the general inefficacy and futility of criminal statutes
on fornication and adultery, see Lecky, op. cit., 298; Cairns, Sex and the
Law in Sex in Civilization, edited by Calverton and Schmalhausen (1929)
200; May, op. cit., Ch. XIII. In England private, voluntary acts of nor-
mal sex expression are not punishable by criminal law. May, op. cit., 221,
225. 3 Blackstone, op. cit., supra, note 24, at 191-192. Thus also in Anglo-
Saxon times the husband could exact physical retribution without being
liable to the vendetta. May, op. cit., supra, note 21, at 60-61. Cf.: "Homi-
cide is justifiable when committed by the husband upon one taken in the
act of adultery with the wife, provided the killing takes place before the
parties to the act have separated." Com. Tex. Stat., P. C., 1928, Art.
1220.
34 Acts 1818, Ch. 5, § 59.
3s Acts 1821, Ch. 23, § 6.
36 A three hundred dollar fine was prescribed for both sexes. Acts
1841, Ch. 104.
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a first offense, and for subsequent offenses the same penalty as
in grand larceny, which was equal for both sexes. 87
The evils of imprisonment for debt were first relieved in favor
of women, in 1835.8 This is reasonable in view of the fact that
women at that time had little control over property and com-
paratively slight opportunity of earning. Imprisonment for
debt for men was not abolished until seven years later.39
It was also felt that a man found begging outside of the county
in which he lived should be deemed a tramp, and penalized for
certain trespasses, whereas women were expressly exempted
from punishment for leading that carefree life.40
There is one discrimination which one would be led to believe
was caused by careless draftsmanship if it did not appear also
in other states. In 1881 it was made a felony for a man to have
carnal knowledge of an insane woman, knowing her to be in-
sane.41 Obviously the social evil against which such a statute
is aimed is not so much the harm which may be done to insane
women as it is the burden on society of illegitimate, imbecile off-
spring. It should make no difference whether the man or the
woman is the sane person. Whichever party is sane should be
criminally responsible, and now is.42 One statute, however, that
can be explained on no basis other than careless draftsmanship
is that of 190548 which is so worded as to make it possible for
a brother to be guilty of incest with his sister, although the
sister is guilty in no event. There can be no reason for the
distinction.
There are other discriminations in the statutes which are
explicable as manifestations of a double standard of morality
and the higher value in which the chastity of woman is held.
87 Acts 1829, Ch. 29, § 4.
8Acts 1835, Ch. 39. Also: "No female . . . shall be imprisoned
upon any order of arrest and bail, or upon an execution against the body."
Acts 1881 (Spec. Ses.), Ch. 38, § 577.
39 Acts 1842, Ch. 55.
40 Acts 1881 (Spec. Ses.), Ch. 37, § 225; reenacted, Acts 1905, Ch. 169,
§ 637. To the same effect is Pa. Stat., 1920, § 21432.
41 Acts 1881 (Spec. Ses.), Ch. 37, § 17. See also, Mass. G. L., 1921,
Ch. 272, § 5; Cons. L. N. Y. (Penal), § 2010 (1); Page's Ann. Ohio G. C.,
1926, § 13025; Wis. Stat., 1929, § 351.06.
42 The inequality was adjusted by Acts 1905, Ch. 169, § 362, providing
that a woman between the ages of eighteen and fifty shall be criminally
responsible for having intercourse with an insane man. Cf.: Gen. Stat.
Conn., 1930 Rev., § 6277.
43 Acts 1905, Ch. 169, § 465.
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Thus, in 1895, it was provided that whoever by publication
"maliciously and falsely charges any female with want of chas-
tity, shall be deemed guilty of criminal libel," but such charges
against men are not prohibited. 44 Similarly, in 1905 it became
a misdemeanor to use obscene language in the presence of
women, although men's ears are not so protected. 45
As respects capital crimes no discrimination for or against
women has been made, although it was provided in 1881 that
execution could be stayed until the birth of a child if the con-
demned woman were enciente at the time of the sentence,46 and
this provision has been carried down to the present time.47
III
CRIMINAL LAWS FOR THE PROTECTION OF WOMEN
1. Desertion and Non-Support
In attempting to pass legislation which will cope with the evil
of the deserting husband who does not support his wife the
lawmaker is confronted with a delicate problem. On the one
hand some kind of legal pressure must be brought to bear upon
the offending husband, while on the other hand corrective meas-
ures in the form of fines or imprisonment may tend only to
enhance the suffering of his wife and children, thus causing the
law to defeat its own purpose.48
44 Acts 1895, Ch. 45; reenacted, Acts 1905, Ch. 169, § 369. Cf.: Com.
Tex. Stat., P. C., 1928, Art. 1293; Act of Mar. 3, 1901, 31 Stat. 1323 (Dist.
of Col.).
45Acts 1905, Ch. 169, § 461. See also, Page's Ann. Ohio G. C., 1926,
§ 13032. In New Jersey it is an offense to send an indecent communica-
tion to a female without her consent. Comp. Stat., 1910, p. 1763. Scandal-
ous lewdness which by the eighteenth century had become a common law
offense (May, op. cit., supra, note 21, at 171), is in Ohio by statute spe-
cifically directed against men for the protection of girls. Page's Ann.
Ohio G. C., 1926, § 12423-1.
40Acts 1881 (Spec. Ses.), Ch. 36, §§299-302. This was no innovation
upon the common law. Blackstone's Commentaries, (1765) Bk. IV, 394-
395.
47 Acts 1889, Ch. 94; Acts 1905, Ch. 169, § 320. Massachusetts also has
a special provision for the pregnant woman who is merely imprisoned.
She may be given a permit to be at liberty or be discharged when "the
best interests of the woman or of her unborn require." G. L., 1921, Ch.
127, § 142.
48 See Gault, In Case of Family Desertion or Non-Support, (1912) 3 J.
of Crim. L. and Criminol. 496.
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Indiana's first attempt to deal with the problem appeared in
1818, 49 when it was provided that if a man deserted his wife,
the overseers of the poor in the township could seize his prop-
erty, if any, under court order, and support her therefrom. If
he had no property he could be put in jail until he provided for
her support, giving security therefor, or until he was otherwise
discharged by the court. Under this statute the deserted wife
did not have direct access even to her own property which had
come to her husband through the marriage or through her; she
could reach such property only through the overseers of the poor
or by special act of the legislature.50 It was not until 1857 that
she was given a right to use her own property, and then only if
her husband was outside of the state. The statute51 was, that if
any man, absenting himself from the state, abandoned his wife
without making sufficient provision for her, the circuit court
might authorize her to sell and convey realty and personalty
which came to the husband by reason of the marriage, to collect
debts due her husband, to receive payment for her labor and that
of her minor children free from debts of her husband, to con-
tract and to sue and defend in her own name as though she were
unmarried. In the same year the courts were given power to
order a sale of any property of a deserting husband for the
support of his wife.52 In 1881, probably in order to make extra-
dition possible, the legislature brought in the criminal element
again in the form of a fine of ten to one hundred dollars for de-
serting a wife or children and leaving them a charge upon the
county.53 This was reenacted in 1905, 54 and again in 1907,
with the exception that a husband should not be guilty who
deserted his wife "for the cause of adultery, or other vicious
or immoral conduct." 55
It is obvious that none of the statutes thus far given will cope
with the problem with any degree of efficacy. To give the de-
49 Acts 1818, Ch. 14.
50 See such a special act in Local Laws 1840, Ch. 75.
51 Acts 1857, Ch. 45.
52 Acts 1857, Ch. 47.
53 Acts 1881 (Spec. Ses.), Ch. 37, § 223. See Page's Ann. Ohio G. C.,
1926, §§ 13008-13010, where a husband is guilty of a criminal offense only
for abandoning a child under sixteen or a pregnant wife.
5 4 Acts 1905, Ch. 169, § 635.
55 Acts 1907, Ch. 49. Compare Fla. Rev. Gen. Stat., 1920, § 5496, pro-
viding that a husband cannot be convicted of desertion and non-support
when, at the time of desertion, he had sufficient grounds to have obtained
a divorce.
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serted wife access to her husband's property is, in most in-
stances, to give her nothing; for the deserting husband is not
generally a man who owns property. To impose a fine upon the
husband only deprives the wife of means which might have con-
tributed to her support; to put him in jail only deprives her of
the possibility of his earning a living. It has been said:
"The court that handles these cases should be a great probation insti-
tution with a group of trained officials at its disposal, with power to im-
prison at hard labor, the compensation for which should go to the family;
with power also to forego commitment on condition that at stated inter-
vals a specified sum be paid to a representative of the court for the support
of the family concerned."58
A suggested uniform act embracing the foregoing qualifica-
tions appeared in 1912, 57 and was substantially enacted in Indi-
ana three years later. The Indiana act 58 provides that one who
fails to furnish necessary food, clothing and medical attention
for his wife or children shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and
shall be subject to a fine of not more than five hundred dollars, to
which may be added a term in the county jail or workhouse for
not more than six months. Upon conviction, however, the court
may suspend sentence and put the defendant on probation for
a period not exceeding two years, conditional upon his support-
ing his family, and may order him to pay a certain sum weekly
to his wife. If the defendant is imprisoned, he may be put to
work upon the roads at a salary of not more than one dollar
per day, which shall be paid to his wife. An obvious improve-
ment of the statute would be to authorize the court in its discre-
tion to apply to the support of the wife and family funds realized
from fines imposed upon the erring husband59 as it may now
apply the amount of his bond when forfeited.60
2. Bastardy
Bastardy statutes in Indiana have for the most part furnished
remedies more of a civil than a criminal nature, the end in view
being the support by the father of the illegitimate child. The
only real reason for making the offense criminal is to render
56 Gault, loc. cit., supra, note 48, at 497.
57 (1912) 3 J. of Crim. L. and Criminol. 618.
58 Acts 1915, Ch. 73.
59 See Mass. G. L., 1921, Ch. 273, § 3; N. J. Comp. Stat., 1924 Cum.
Supp., § 52-73e.
60 See also Wis. Stat., 1929, § 351.30.
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extradition possible. The territorial assembly first dealt with
this problem by authorizing justices of the peace, in proceedings
before them, to compel the payment to the mother of such lump
sum as she might accept in full satisfaction, or in the alternative
to charge the father with the maintenance of the child.61 In 1818
it was provided that if the putative father, upon being sued,
confessed that he was guilty, he should be compelled to pay the
mother such sum as she would be willing to accept in full satis-
faction, and to give a bond to the overseers of the poor for sup-
port of the child. If the mother failed to sue, the overseers
might do so, and the court was authorized to order him to pro-
vide support for the child.62 In 1875 the prosecuting witness was
given authority to dismiss the suit after entering of record an
admission that proper provision had been made to her sat-
isfaction for the child.63 Two years later the penal element
came into the remedy. It was provided6 4 that the court should
make such order as should seem just for the maintenance and
education of the child,6 5 payments to the mother to be annual.
The defendant was to be required to give good freehold surety
for the execution of the judgment, and upon default he was to
be confined in jail. If at the end of twelve months he was still
unable to comply with the order, he might be released by the
court.66
61 Acts Ind. Ter., 1810, Ch. 33.
62_Acts 1818, Ch. 36. In New York the poor officers alone, not the
mother, can prosecute the father or compromise with him. 41 Cons. L.
(Poor), §§ 60-75; Commissioner of Public Welfare v. Chandler, 123 Misc.
201, 204 N. Y. S. 187 (1922).
63 Acts 1875 (Spec. Ses.), Ch. 4. In some states prosecution can be
dropped only if the court or some officer on behalf of the public is satis-
fied that proper provision for support of the child has been made. E. g.,
Gen. Stat. Conn., 1930 Rev., § 5870; Mass. G. L., 1921, Ch. 273, § 17.
64 Acts 1877, Ch. 3.
65 The Ohio act provides also for cost of confinement and of prosecu-
tion. Page's Ann. G. C., 1926, Tit. IV, Div. VIII, Ch. 2.
66 There are a few variations in other states. In Massachusetts the
court may revise its order for maintenance from time to time as circum-
stances or the welfare of the child may require. G. L., 1921, Ch. 273, § 14.
In New Jersey the bastardy action may also be brought by "the person
having the physical custody of the child." Comp. Stat., 1930 Supp., § 18-39.
Many states also have special criminal statutes for concealment of the
birth of illegitimate issue. E. g., N. J. Comp. Stat., 1910, p. 1784; Wis.
Stat., 1929, § 351.06.
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8. Seduction
Seduction, another crime which by its very definition is aimed
at the protection of women, 67 appeared first, in a form closely
approximating abduction, in the Laws of the Governor and
Judges of Indiana Territory. The statute68 had three provi-
sions: (1) It shall be a felony to "take any woman . .
against her will unlawfully," and the act says that its purpose
is the protection of women against being abducted as a means of
securing their consent in marriage, the motive of the misdoers
evidently being to obtain their property.69 (2) If any person
abducts a "maiden or woman child unmarried, being within the
age of sixteen years," against the will of the person in whose
lawful keeping she is, he shall be subject to imprisonment for
not over two years. (3) If any person shall take away and
"deflower any such maid," or contract secret marriage with her,
he shall be subject to imprisonment for not over five years
"without bail or mainprize."
The modern statutory crime of seduction appears for the first
time in 1847.70 The crime consisted of an illicit connection,
under promise of marriage, with a female of good repute and less
than twenty-one years of age. The penalty was a fine of not
more than five thousand dollars and one to three years imprison-
ment, provided that the jury might substitute for the latter a
jail sentence of from ninety days to one year if there were
mitigating circumstances. The promise of marriage could not
be established by the testimony of the woman unless it were
"corroborated by other evidence, either strongly circumstantial
or positive." The only alteration in the handling of the offense
has been in the penalty. In 1852 it was made imprisonment of
one to three years and a fine of not more than five hundred
07 Compare the following English editorial comment: "In a fairly
recent Bill a section was inserted, at the suggestion of certain feminists,
to make seduction of a youth by a woman older than himself an offense,
and thus give some colour to the equality principle, but, fortunately for
our reputation for humour and common-sense, it was dropped. The spec-
tacle of the young prosecutor giving evidence that the injury (?) was done
to him without his consent would not have been edifying." (1929) 73
Solicitors' Journ. 696.
68 Acts Ind. Ter., 1804, Ch. 6, §§ 2-4.
69 Cf.: 3 Hen. VII, c. 2 (1487); 4 & 5 Ph. & Mar. c. 8 (1557).
70 Acts 1847, Ch. 95.
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dollars, or imprisonment in the county jail for any term up to
six months.7 1 In 1881 the maximum prison term was made five
years,7 2 and the 1905 legislature added to the jail sentence a
fine of not more than one hundred dollars.73
4. Rape
In the statutes dealing with rape one element in the definition
of the crime has remained constant throughout-sexual inter-
course with a woman forcibly against her will. The variations
have come in the penalties provided, and in that part of the
definition of the crime which has to do with the age of the
parties. These two elements of the crime have fluctuated very
actively. The first statute on the subject was passed two years
after Indiana became a state, prescribing the death penalty for
rape as defined above,74 and for carnal knowledge of a woman
child under the age of ten,73 and a penalty of thirty-nine to one
hundred stripes for assault with intent to commit rape.76 In
1852 the age of consent for the girl was raised to twelve years, 77
and there was a substantial reduction of the penalty, making it
from two to twenty-one years in prison.7 8 Seven years later it
was provided that anyone who was convicted of having had
carnal knowledge of an insane female person other than his
wife, knowing her to be insane, should be subject to a sentence
of two to ten years at hard labor.79 In 1881 this was combined
with a rape statute, similar to that of 1852, with a penalty of
five to twenty-one years. The legislature of 1881 also defined
what should constitute sufficient proof of the commission of the
crime,80 and provided that the killing of a person in perpetra-
71 Rev. Stat. 1852, p. 401.
72 Acts 1881 (Spec. Ses.), Ch. 37, § 87. In the same year the seduced
woman was given a civil action for her own seduction. Ibid., Ch. 38, § 26.
73 Acts 1905, Ch. 169, § 458. Some jurisdictions have special provisions
as to seduction of female pupils by teachers. See Act of Mar. 13, 1901,
31 Stat. 1331 (Dist. of Col.); Page's Ann. Ohio G. C., 1926, § 13030.
74 Acts 1818, Ch. 5, § 49.
75 Ibid., § 66.
76 Ibid., § 67; reenacted, Acts 1821, Ch. 23, § 3.
77 At common law there was some doubt as to whether the age of con-
sent should be ten or twelve. Blackstone's Comi mntries, (1765) Bk. IV,
p. 12.
78 Rev. Stat. 1852, Vol. ii, p. 400.
79 Acts 1859, Ch. 62.
80 Acts 1881 (Spec. Ses.), Ch. 36, § 233; reenacted, Acts 1905, Ch. 169,
§ 243.
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tion of, or attempt to perpetrate, rape should constitute first
degree murder.8' The latter provision appears again in 1929
with death as a penalty.82 In 1893 the age of consent was raised
to fourteen, and the minimum term of imprisonment reduced to
one year.83
Twelve years later a new statute84 was passed defining the
crime as: (1) sexual intercourse with a woman forcibly against
her will or of a girl under the age of fourteen, and (2) sexual
intercourse of a man over seventeen with an insane or feeble
minded woman or with an inmate of a poor asylum, of the
Woman's Prison, or of the Industrial School for Girls.8 5 The
minimum sentence was raised to two years, and a proviso was
added that if the girl assaulted were under the age of ten im-
prisonment should be for life. The next General Assembly
raised the age of consent to sixteen and made the sentence of
life imprisonment apply if the girl were under twelve.8 6 In
1921 another rape statute was enacted, 7 keeping the definition
of the 1905 act, as amended, except that the man's age is changed
from seventeen to eighteen, and with the rather significant
change that a woman may also be guilty of rape if she has an
unlawful sexual connection with a male child under sixteen.8 s
The penalty was changed to a fine of not over one thousand
dollars and imprisonment of five to twenty-one years, with the
same penalty applicable to attempted rape. The life sentence
was retained if the offense were committed on a girl under
twelve. This comprehensive statute lasted but six years.
In 1927 the legislature passed a new act89 dividing rape into
first and second degrees. First degree rape is rape as defined
in the 1921 act, and carries a penalty of five to twenty-one years.
Second degree rape is defined as sexual intercourse with a female
under the age of eighteen and in such a way as not to constitute
first degree rape, that is, with a girl between the ages of sixteen
81 Acts 1881 (Spec. Ses.), Ch. 37, § 3.
82 Acts 1929, Ch. 54.
83 Acts 1893, Ch. 23.
84 Acts 1905, Ch. 169, § 361.
85 This act also provides a penalty for a woman who has an unlawful
connection with an insane man. See spr, note 42.
86 Acts 1907, Ch. 60.
87 Acts 1921, Ch. 148.
88 Compare note 67, supra.
89 Acts 1927, Ch. 201.
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and eighteen, and with her consent. The penalty is fixed at one
to ten years imprisonment.
The constant and haphazard vacillation shown in the statu-
tory history of this crime90 is certainly cogent evidence that the
90 As between different jurisdictions at the present time the whole
gamut of possible variations appears. The following table shows the
crime in twelve jurisdictions picked at random.
Penalty for Rape-
Forcible Sexual Con-
nection With an
Adult Woman
Imprisonment up to 30
years.
Death or life Imprison-
ment.
Imprisonment of 5 to 21
years.
Age of Defendant
No provision.
Statute abrogates com-
mon law age limit of 14
years and provides that
jury shall determine de-
fendant's capability to
commit rape.
Eighteen.
Imprisonment for life or No provision.
for any term of years.
Jurisdiction
Connecticut
Florida
Indiana
Massachusetts
New Jersey
New York
Ohio
Pennsylvania
Texas
Wisconsin
District of
Columbia
England
Sixteen, as to offense
committed on girl un-
der 12; otherwise no
provision.
Fourteen, unless, being
under that age, defend-
ant is proved to have
physical capacity to
commit rape.
Eighteen, as to offense
committed on girl un-
der 16; otherwise no
provision.
Sixteen, as to offense
committed on girl un-
der 16; otherwise no
provision.
Fourteen.
Age of incapacity not
provided, but penalty
for statutory rape is
greater if defendant is
13 or over.
No provision.
No provision.
Age of Consent
Sixteen.
Ten.
If the girl is under 18
the offense is second de-
gree rape; if she is un-
der 16 it is first degree.
Sixteen.
Twelve.
Eighteen.
Sixteen.
Sixteen, but if Jury finds
girl under that age not
to be of good repute for
chastity, and to have
consented, convic-
tion shall be for forni-
cation only.
Eighteen, provided that
if she is over 16 the de-
fendant may show that
she is not of previous
chaste character as a de-
fense In consent cases.
Eighteen.
Sixteen.
Sixteen.
Fine up to $6,000, or
imprisonment at hard
labor up to 30 years, or
both.
Imprisonment up to 20
years.
Imprisonment of 3 to 20
years.
Fine of $1,000, and soli-
tary confinement at hard
labor, or simple impris-
onment, up to 15 years.
Death, or imprisonment
for life or for any term
of years not less than 5.
Imprisonment of 1 to 30
years, provided that if
woman Is shown to be
a prostitute the penalty
shall be I to 7 years.
Imprisonment up to 30
years. or death penalty
in the discretion of the
jury.
Penal servitude for life
or for not less than 3
years, or imprisonment
with or without hard
labor for not more than
2 years.
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legislature has been acting in darkness-a darkness for which
there is probably as yet no light. In their groping back and
forth for age limits for the parties, the lawmakers should re-
ceive some assistance from medicine, psychology and allied
sciences. As to fixing penalties for the crime, help will have to
come from the science of penology, if it can be called a science.
But even with the help of all the abstract scientific information
in the world, the social ideals of the community in which the law
is to operate will have a great influence on its content. It is
probably also true that some of what has been done with this
crime has been in direct response to unappealed, and hence un-
reported cases. The feeling of the average person about the
crime of rape is simply that it is horrible and that something
drastic should be done about it; and such a feeling constitutes
just about all the material with which the legislator has to
work.
(To be concluded)
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